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Abstract. The era of Internet of Things (IoT) being a combination of various 
networking and computing technologies already in a state of growth that introduces 
a new age of data aggregation mechanism and ubiquitous connectivity among 
physical objects. However, the most of the cyber threats still remain unsolved and 
may create huge impact on our lives. One of the possible major changes in impact 
landscape is the imminent physical results of cyber threats as IoT technologies 
enable closer interactions between humans and information systems. Although the 
cyber threats to critical infrastructures have been highly considered by the cyber 
security community, the cases with catastrophic physical impacts are rare which 
means the impact posture has not exactly shifted from information centric impacts 
to physical ones. However, widespread usage of IoT technologies have the potential 
to accelerate this shift which may bring the threat of cyber terrorism into the picture. 
This paper provides a preliminary comparison of a typical IoT application in health 
area with an industrial control system (ICS) in order to show that IoT applications 
are required to be deeply assessed as terrorists may attack them with easy-to-
implement cyberattacks for the purpose of creating physical harm. 
Keywords. Internet of Things, cyberterrorism, critical infrastructures 
1. Introduction 
Internet of things in the simplest of terms can be referred to as the connection of things 
or objects over the internet.  It is a major concept in technological revolution that is set 
to leap frog the current internet infrastructure concept with a more advanced computing 
network where all the physical objects around us can be uniquely identifiable and 
ubiquitously connected to one another [1]. One of the keys to ensuring internet of things 
is the combination of different technologies among several billions of objects such as the 
internet (including wireless technologies and Bluetooth), RFID sensors, Near Field 
Communication and infra-red etc.  
 
Despite the enormous advantages and perceived ease of life, there exist challenges 
and threats this comfort can pose. It is already identified that some challenges such as 
improper authentication mechanism currently present in RFID, tag cloning, wireless 
technologies being more vulnerable to hacks including eavesdropping and excess noise 
signals can cause RF Jamming [2]. Intelligent transport systems are already present in 
smart cities, wearable devices in hospitals, smart sensors for braking system in 
automobiles. Next maybe a connection between a refrigerator and a mobile device, smart 
environment, smart cooking utensils that will perceive and smell.  Over reliance and the 
perceived implication of IoT in the future will mean that the current threat perception 
established for the existing technologies needs to be channeled towards securing the IoT 
technologies.  
There is still no general definition for cyberterrorism, but it can be characterized as 
the use of cyber means to create havoc that can lead to the crippling of a nation’s critical 
infrastructure such as power grid, air traffic control system, banking and military 
systems, health systems and in turn resulting to violence, fear and loss of life and 
property. The concept of cyberterrorism underlines the involvement of a non-state actor 
that is a group or an individual carrying out cyber attacks [3]. Till date an official 
cyberterrorism act has not been confirmed anywhere around the world [4]. 
From the technical point of view, major requirement of a cyberterrorism activity is 
creating a physical harm with cyber means. Stuxnet and Ukrainian power outage cases 
showed the possible destruction and disruption consequences of cyber attacks although 
they have not been classified as cyberterrorism acts due to the fact that threat actors 
behind the incidents are likely to be state-sponsored rather than non-state groups. These 
cases, however, showed that physical harm by cyber attack is possible and raised the 
question whether there exists a terrorist organization that may have willingness and 
capability to utilize such kind of cyber means. The most prevailing prediction is that the 
terrorist organizations have not sufficient technical capabilities for the realization of such 
sophisticated attacks and other physical attack alternatives are cost effective than cyber 
ones [5] [6]. 
 Threat actors behave in a rational manner as they choose cost-effective methods 
requiring less amount of efforts and cheaper equipment and try to minimize the 
probability of being caught by law enforcement bodies or defenders. There occurs huge 
number of actual cybercrime or cyber espionage incidents as criminals have identified 
very easy ways for having economic gains and cyber espionage provides a safer method 
for criminals or nation-sponsored groups. The common denominator of all these 
incidents is that threat actors intend to create information-based damages on the target 
information systems. On the other side, very limited cyber incidents with major physical 
damage have happened although there exists widespread fears about the security of 
critical infrastructures. Based on these facts, it can be derived that current cyber security 
posture is mostly composed of threats having information-based rather than physical-
based impacts. Cyberterrorism threats may extend the threat landscape with the latter 
category in case of any possible alterations in the cost-effective equilibrium. As IoT 
applications increase the interaction between humans and information systems, their 
security vulnerabilities may enable terrorist organizations to conduct easier attacks with 
physical impacts. The studies in the literature analyze the likelihood of cyberterrorism 
threats according to the context of critical infrastructures and come up with the 
conclusion that cyber mean is not a cost-effective attack method [4, 5, 6]. IoT 
applications, however, have not been analyzed in their specific application context from 
the cyberterrorism point of view. 
This study provides a preliminary comparison between a sample IoT application and 
a industrial control system (ICS), a typical information system in critical infrastructures, 
in order to show that IoT applications may change the cost-effective equilibrium for 
cyberterrorism threats. A smart healthcare system is chosen as an IoT application in the 
study. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of cyber 
incidents that have occurred or may likely occur in in health sector particularly in a smart 
healthcare systems. Section 3 gives information about the major incidents with 
significant physical results in various critical infrastructures. The comparison of both 
systems is given in section 4.. Section 5 evaluates the comparison from the 
cyberterrorism perspective. The conclusion is presented in section 6.     
2. Cyber Threats to Smart Healthcare Systems 
According to the 2016 internet security threat report by Symantec [7], the health services 
sector remains the most breached industry sub sector in terms of the number of incidents 
occurred.  Just recently in 2015, over 80 million patient records were stolen by a 
hacktivist group from a leading health care facility in the United States [8]. Health data 
is considered as more valuable than credit card numbers in black market and the 
resiliency level of relevant systems is lower than the systems in similar sectors such as 
financial and retail which means health sector is one of the important targets of cyber 
criminals who are seeking economic gains [9]. There has happened many ransomware 
incidents in hospitals such as Hollywood Presbyterian Hospital Medical Center paid 40 
Bitcoins ($17,000), and Horry County school district in South Carolina paid $8500 to 
decrypt a crypto ransomware [10]. Although these attacks were not targeted towards 
individual patients, paying the ransom meant they were significant situations for 
hospitals as they rely on up-to-date information from patient records. Without quick 
access to drug histories, surgery directives and other information, patient care can get 
delayed or halted, which makes hospitals more likely to pay a ransom rather than risk 
delays that could result in death and lawsuits.  
While information-based damages of cyber threats is the current significant concern, 
IoT applications in this field may cause physical-based consequences as they directly 
interact with physical phenomenon related with humans. According to [11], of the 15 
billion devices found within the IoT in 2015, 30.3% belong to healthcare which includes 
electronic recordkeeping, portable health monitoring, pharmaceutical safeguards and the 
remaining 69.7% were found elsewhere. This shows that millions of people are relying 
on smart devices to keep up with their health status which means these devices can be an 
important target for the cyber threat actors seeking ways to physically harm humans.   
 
In 2007, a supposed attack on the United States vice president, Dick Cheney was 
assumed to be prevented by disabling the wireless function of the implantable 
Cardioverter Defibrillators (ICDs). The possibility of exploiting the device was further 
confirmed by researchers at the University of Massachusetts, Harvard Medical School 
and University of Washington who suggested a software radio-based attack was possible 
[12]. Medical devices such as pacemakers, insulin pump, neuro-stimulators, and drug 
delivery pumps are increasingly in demand to manage medical conditions.  These devices 
are mostly communicating via wireless technology and so are exposed to cyber threats. 
In 2014, the United States Homeland Security pointed out two threat scenarios. One was 
instructing insulin pumps to overdose a patient with drugs and the other was to control 
pacemakers to perform battery draining operations that would result to loss of pacing 
output without warning [13]. An attack also demonstrated in [14] also showed how 
insulin pumps could be remotely turned off and also changing the device configurations 
without the patients’ knowledge.  
Doctors are being trusted by their patients when they administer drugs. This same 
trust is established when a smart health system administers drug to a remote patient. 
Suppose a smart health system that returns drug prescription to a patient were to be 
threatened by a man in the middle attack. A remote attacker could intercept data and 
return a health threatening prescription and thousands of patients’ lives could be 
endangered due to intentional medication errors. The use of computerized drug 
dispensaries can cause havoc and possible death of patients [15]. 
Although, recent cyber-attacks on health systems has been for the purpose of 
copying patients health records for monetary gain, there is a possibility to further extend 
the attack by terrorists to jeopardize the patients safety. Copying patients’ records from 
a directory gives the terrorist an idea of what to modify in the system that may take the 
doctor a long time to detect. Doctors rely on records in treating patients and so a modified 
record used to treat patients could have a long standing effect of the patients’ health. 
Lives could be lost in the process.  It is also possible for a terrorist to manipulate the 
functions of a sensor by an easy attack that deceives the user into thinking the sensor is 
functioning effectively and then passes malicious data [16].  Another danger in use of 
IoT in healthcare system is in the use of the automated medical devices itself in 
performing daily medical operations. Most of these devices are known to have loopholes 
that provides the opportunity to be controlled from remote locations by attackers. As 
reported in [17], zeus and citadel malwares were discovered in an x-ray system, a blood 
gas analyzer and a PACS (Picture Archive and Communications System) which left 
backdoors that basically provided remote access and control. This is extremely 
detrimental to the safety and well-being of patients and in a situation where the primary 
goal of the cyber terrorist is to cause harm to human lives, a resulting death is possible. 
3. Cyber Threats to ICSs 
Industries before the evolution of automated control systems have relied heavily on 
manual labor in carrying out daily industrial activities and controls. To make it easier, 
ICSs provided the possibility to interact with physical processes by providing an 
automated control from a remote location with the use of SCADA, distributed control 
systems and programmable logic controllers [18]. This systems are present in well-
known critical infrastructures such as the electric power grids, oil and gas infrastructures, 
industrial chemical and production plants, pipeline infrastructures [19] as well as in 
discrete manufacturing which includes aerospace and automotive sectors [18].  
Stuxnet can be considered as the most significant case that shows how a cyber threat 
can harm a very strategic critical infrastructure, Iranian uranium enrichment plant in 
Natanz, with a physical destruction. It is a very sophisticated malware that targets 
industrial control system by modifying the codes of programming logic controllers with 
the aim of causing fast-spinning in nuclear centrifuges and hiding these effects from 
operators [20]. The complex attack vector includes windows and PLC rootkits, zero-day 
vulnerabilities, compromised digital certificates, command control infrastructure and 
antivirus evasion techniques [21]. Besides these advanced technical methods, collection 
of detailed intelligence about the industrial control systems and a testing environment 
having similar hardware, software and industrial equipment are highly required to 
conduct such a highly complicated cyber attack. Only the state-based actors which have 
advanced technical and intelligence capabilities can be the origins of these threats.  
Critical infrastructures and sectors are dependent on the power grid for proper 
functioning which means they can be primary targets as in the Ukrainian power grid 
cyber-attack. On December 23rd 2015, the Ukrainian power grid was attacked from a 
remote network point that resulted in disconnecting about 230,000 people from the power 
source after an infiltration into the SCADA system [22]. One part of the attack steps was 
to disable the backup power source which was the Uninterruptible Power Supply [23]. 
Oil and gas pipeline systems under the control of an ICS could be physically 
damaged by a cyber attack. A report in [24] stated an attack as far back as 1982 where 
SCADA systems were used to increase the pressure of a liquid flow thereby causing a 
burst that damaged the pipeline infrastructure. In the description of the attack, a Trojan 
horse was used to initiate a major explosion of the trans-Siberian gas pipeline. The Trojan 
horse was installed after the pipeline control system was hijacked and was used to 
increase the usual pressure leading to an explosion. It is argued that the attack was known 
as the first cyber-attack causing external physical effect on an oil and gas operation [24]. 
However, it is not clear whether such incident happened as there is no any media report 
from 1982 and former officials of Soviet Union denies the incident [25].  
4. Comparison of Smart Healthcare and ICS 
In this section, smart healthcare and ICSs are compared with each other from the 
perspective of ongoing organizational practices in the relevant business sectors and 
actual technical characteristics of both systems as cyber security is a matter of 
organizational and technical aspects. The main aim is to evaluate the factors that may 
influence the required sophistication level of threat actors and the amount of resources 
for conducting the cyber attacks with major physical impacts. 
The security and safety approaches of business sectors have different variations. The 
sectors of many critical infrastructures such as energy and transportation share a 
profound safety culture. Although ICSs have not been designed and developed with 
resiliency against cyber threats, safety standards and practices have addressed many 
human errors, system failures and environmental threats in the related sectors. This 
common safety culture is supported by effective organizational measures like detailed 
contingency plans, operative maintenance procedures and effective auditing activities.  
Health sector is lack of similar standards and organizational practices. Privacy culture in 
this sector can be considered as an advantage when compared to critical sectors but 
privacy practices mostly deal with the regulation and management of intentional 
information sharing activities between relevant parties which causes a loss of focus on 
fighting with cyber threats. From technical point of view, in critical sectors, safety 
standards may assist to eliminate some system failures and human errors which may 
otherwise make the attacks easier. Increased organizational capabilities may at least 
enable them to effectively deal with incidents after they happen. 
A typical network topology of a critical infrastructure is composed of mainly two 
major networks, enterprise network and industrial control network. Enterprise network 
is the one that highly interacts with Internet as it includes the common network services 
such as e-mail and web servers, other main assets like database servers and user 
computers.  
Industrial control network consists of master terminal unit (MTU) that runs a 
SCADA system and carries out the central control function for entire industrial 
processes. Programmable logic controllers (PLC) and remote terminal units (RTU) 
distributed to the different parts of a critical infrastructure collects data from sensors and 
field devices, convey it to MTU and relays the control commands of MTU to those 
devices. Enterprise network is separated from Internet and industrial control network 
with firewalls. MTU and PLCs/RTUs are located in a wide area networks which use 
dedicated lines rather than Internet. On the other side, in a smart healthcare system, 
sensors deployed in different formats such as wearable device or a component of mobile 
phone obtain data from individuals and send it to a central database of a hospital.  
Although similar type of data exchange between sensors and command control units 
take place in both industrial control and healthcare systems, the interfaces of healthcare 
systems are more exposed to attacks coming from Internet.  Data between industrial field 
devices and the SCADA system is sent over a dedicated network rather than a public 
network such as the internet as shown in Figure 1. This is in contrast with communication 
in the smart healthcare systems where data is forwarded over Internet via wireless or 
cellular networks. In order to compromise the industrial control network, an attacker is 
required to have foothold in the enterprise network and then attack to endpoints, MTU 
and RTUs/PLCs, or manipulate the data communication between these parties. In a 
healthcare system, however, communication parties and the data traffic are directly 
exposed to Internet based threats. The data collection part is integrated to insecure home 
networks where attackers can take advantage of many easily exploitable vulnerabilities 
in those networks. The command control and data storage functions are performed by the 
systems in health organizations of a sector having many security breaches [7]. As the 
data flow occurs over Internet, this system is more vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle 
attacks. Abovementioned architecture difference shows that healthcare systems can be 
compromised by the attackers with lower sophistication levels. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of communication in smart health systems and SCADA network 
 
Smart healthcare systems uses various devices that utilize a combination of several  
technologies such as sensors, actuators, RFID, bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, ethernet, 
GSM/UMTS, mobile aggregators (PDAs, mobile phones), databases and cloud servers 
[26] with each having existing  security issues. This susceptibility makes it easier to 
initiate an attack since several technologies can lead to many vulnerabilities. Health 
devices do not require a lot of sophistication to be attacked [27]. It was seen how patients 
who thought their insulin pumps weren’t functioning as they wanted, went online to 
search for the hard coded authorization credentials, logged in to the devices and then 
increased the dosage. They later had issues with their respiratory system [27].  
Integration of different technologies requires evaluation of the whole system from 
an interoperability point of view. Apart from the existence of individual vulnerabilities 
in each system component, lack of interoperability may create additional security burden 
especially on the data collection part of a smart healthcare system. IoT applications in 
healthcare suffers from many interoperability problems [28]. On the other side, in spite 
of existing problems in industrial control networks, interoperability has been addressed 
by the safety community for a longer time than the recently developed IoT community. 
If the existing vulnerabilities in IoT devices are considered together with the increased 
susceptibility of healthcare systems to internet-based attacks, interoperability problem 
may act as a multiplier effect on the system weaknesses. 
Malicious actors utilize social engineering techniques as an initial penetration vector 
in their attacks such as in their spear phishing campaigns. The improvement of user 
awareness is the main countermeasure against these type of attack methods. Customers 
are not directly interact with ICSs, only a particular set of staff deals with them whereas 
in smart healthcare systems, customers have main roles in the system. In a critical 
infrastructure, an attacker can get a foothold in the enterprise network with a spear 
phishing attempt but he is also required to penetrate into industrial control network. An 
attacker can reach to the same goal with an easier method in a healthcare system. 
Although lower user awareness level is still an important problem in critical 
infrastructure companies, it is more problematic in healthcare systems as the customers 
are at the core of applications. Critical infrastructure companies can apply strict internal 
security practices, procedures and technological solutions to tighten the security within 
their premises and conduct user awareness campaign for their staff but it is more difficult 
to take the same actions against customers of a smart healthcare system. 
Critical infrastructures have different systems that monitor the ongoing industrial 
processes and environmental factors. In cases of process anomalies, this advanced 
monitoring capability, which is mostly complemented by well-developed maintenance 
procedures, enables maintenance and other technical staff to intervene into the problem 
in their earlier stages after physical consequences start to be appear. Unless monitoring 
capability is compromised, a cyber threat with physical damage can be detected and a 
maintenance or recovery procedure can reduce the consequences. In a smart healthcare 
system, additional monitoring capabilities do not generally exist due the system 
simplicity or if they exist, they can be easily compromised by attackers. The 
consequences of attacks can be imminent so that a possible physical effect of a 
cyberattack cannot be easily recovered. In critical infrastructures, recovery methods 
based on manual controls may be alternative options for limiting the damage as it 
happened in mass power outage case in Ukraine.   
5. Evaluation of Comparison Results 
The above preliminary comparison between smart healthcare and ICSs shows that 
such an IoT implementation can be compromised by cyber attacks requiring less 
sophistication and resources. Although ICSs also benefit from IoT technologies for the 
improvement of their functionalities, the main perspective in the comparison is that many 
IoT applications such as smart healthcare application enable humans to directly interact 
with information systems in more uncontrolled environments which may lead to extend 
current cyber threat posture with threats creating physical-based impacts. 
State-sponsored groups can be interested in conducting cyber attacks with physical-
based impacts for sabotage purposes as Stuxnet and Ukrainian mass power outage cases 
clearly demonstrated. These groups may acquire required sophistication level and find 
relevant resources. As the anonymity of an espionage activity and safety of spies are 
significant concerns for states, cyber means can be an effective method when compared 
to other methods.  
Cyberterrorism threat, however, is highly contested issue. It is argued that terrorists 
prefer physical attacks as they require lower sophistication levels and less resources. The 
other main argument is that cyber attacks are not suitable for creation of a widespread 
fear due to their limited media impact [5]. Terrorist organizations, however, may try to 
give a message to people that they are not even safe while sitting at their homes by 
attacking to IoT applications such as smart healthcare system.  They can plan to conduct 
cyber attacks to different targets in addition to separate physical attacks within the same 
time-frame in order to rise the level of fear. They may even want to strengthen the belief 
of their members to the organization by demonstrating that they have also advanced 
cyber capabilities which means internal politics of organization may be a primary reason 
in some cases. It is probable that terrorist organizations may identify how to benefit from 
the cyber capability once they acquire it.  
Cost-benefit analysis of cyberterrorism activities have been done with the 
consideration of critical infrastructures [4, 5, 6] . Although problems in critical 
infrastructures may threaten the whole city, region or even state, the possibility of cyber 
threat is very low due to the high sophistication need and ineffectiveness of attacks from 
cost-benefit perspective.  It means there exists a risk with enormous impact but very 
small possibility. With the advent of IoT technologies, a new spectrum of systems have 
been emerged that have different characteristics than the usual critical infrastructures. 
The overall impact of a cyberterrorist activity on these systems may not be as high as the 
impact on critical infrastructures, however they may be still reasonable target for 
terrorists due to possible physical results. Abovementioned preliminary comparison 
argues that IoT applications such as smart healthcare systems can be targeted by attackers 
with less capability and resources. It is important to deeply analyze the situation and be 
ready for the possible cyberterrorism threats. 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
In many studies, it is argued that cyber-attacks are not preferable tools for terrorists 
to reach their main objectives of physical damage. Not having any reported cyber 
terrorism incident supports this argument. However, the viability assessments of cyber 
threats have been done according to the considerations of critical infrastructure 
environments. On the other side, IoT technology which establishes high interactions 
between humans and information systems has been adapted to provide many applications 
in various areas of human lives. Cyber threats addressing these applications may cause 
physical destruction. This paper presents a preliminary comparison of a sample IoT 
application with a industrial control system to show that IoT applications can be an 
important target for the cyber attacks of terrorists as they may require less sophistication 
and resources 
As a future work, cyber attacks to different IoT applications will be analyzed in 
detail with attack tree method which can provide a coherent way for the analysis of 
adversarial factors such as capability and resource requirements.  
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